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Regulating Offensiveness: Snyder v. 




Since 2005, the Reverend Fred Phelps and other members of the Westboro 
Baptist Church have outraged almost everyone by protesting near military 
funerals.1 In Snyder v. Phelps the Supreme Court will finally decide whether 
that outrage is actionable.2 Few people will lose sleep if the Court finds that the 
First Amendment allows Albert Snyder to sue the Phelpses for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy for protesting near his 
 
Copyright © 2010 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a 
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of 
their publications. 
† Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. I am 
indebted to Heidi Kitrosser, Lyrissa Lidsky, Caroline Malla Corbin, Jen Robbennolt, Charles 
Smith, Jesse Frogge, Slone Isselhard, and the participants at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Law 
& Society Association, where I presented an earlier version of this Essay. Thanks also to Gina 
Harrison, Heath Hooper and Dave Winters for their research assistance. I coauthored and 
submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in Snyder v. Phelps. See Brief of Amici Curiae 
Scholars of First Amendment Law in Support of Respondent Phelps, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-
751 (U.S.  July 14, 2010).  
1. Lizette Alvarez, Outrage At Funeral Protests Pushes Lawmakers to Act, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 17, 2006, at A14 (quoting Indiana Representative Steve Buyer describing Phelps’ behavior as 
“repugnant, outrageous, [and] despicable”). Others refer to the Phelpses as “pieces of garbage” 
and “evil.” Geoff Oldfather, A Good Way to Handle Westboro Protestors: Ignore Them, FORT 
PIERCE TRIB. (Fla.), May 22, 2008, at B6; Michael Bearak, Westboro Baptist Church Is Evil, 
DIGITAL J., Apr. 11, 2010, http://www.digitaljournal.com/article/290434. 
2. 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-
751). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649632
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son’s funeral.3 After all, their messages, including statements such as “Semper 
Fi Fags,” “Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “America is Doomed,” “God Hates 
the USA,” “God Hates You,” and “Pope in Hell”4 were objectionable and 
mean-spirited. Snyder must have viewed their speech as “an affront of the most 
egregious kind.”5 
This case, however, has the potential to undo decades of the Court’s 
jurisprudence protecting offensive speech. Nothing about Snyder suggests the 
Phelpses disrupted the funeral.6 Rather, Snyder and his supporters wish to 
restrict the Phelpses’ speech because they find it abhorrent and inappropriate. 
But the Court’s free speech jurisprudence does not allow government-
sanctioned punishment of speech solely because others find the message 
offensive.7 It allows regulation of speech only if the speech contains objective 
indicia of harm, such as speech accompanied by physical or aural invasions, 
threats, or violence.8 These requirements exist for good reason. Absent 
objective indicia of harm, regulation of offensive speech amounts to content-
based censorship and “effectively empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents 
simply as a matter of personal predilections.”9   
Psychological research on emotions validates the Court’s approach by 
revealing that anger—the emotion most likely involved with speech we find 
offensive—is inextricably linked to censorship. Put simply, individuals get 
angry when others demean their personal or social identities.10 Speech that 
criticizes or ridicules another’s deeply held personal beliefs or values 
exemplifies such an offense. The resulting anger often leads to responsive 
action, including the desire to punish the offensive speech.11 Individual 
perceptions of what amounts to a demeaning offense vary greatly, however, 
depending on particular worldviews, internalized cultural norms, and personal 
experiences and beliefs.12 Thus, reactions to speech are the result of a 
complicated interplay between the content of speech and an individual’s 
subjective emotions.   
The Court’s requirement of external indicia of harm, such as imminent 
violence, intuitively recognizes and protects against our subjective and 
unpredictable emotional responses to speech. Absent an external constraint, 
 
3. Mr. Snyder sued Fred Phelps and several others, including Mr. Phelps’s daughters, 
Shirley Phelps-Roper and Rebekah Phelps-Davis. See id. at 211–12. 
4. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008).  
5. Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REV. 151, 153 (2008).   
6. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 212 (noting that the Phelpses maintained a distance of several 
hundred feet from the funeral and were not noisy or disruptive). 
7. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
8. See infra Part III. 
9. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
10. RICHARD J. LAZARUS, EMOTION & ADAPTATION 217, 222 (1991).  
11. Id. at 226. 
12. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. 
REV. 851, 892 (2009). 
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allowing anger or outrage to guide regulation of speech leads to suppression of 
speech simply because the content offends a listener’s world view. 
Unfortunately, the arguments made in favor of tort liability in Snyder 
effectively bypass such external indicia by asking the Court to allow tort 
liability based on little more than the Phelpses’ offensive messages.13 Such an 
approach is especially dangerous in the context of civil liability. Unlike 
generally applicable criminal laws that clearly notify people of behavior that is 
out-of-bounds, tort lawsuits involve individual disputes between discrete 
parties. Without a requirement that the speech contain external indicia of harm, 
anyone can bring a claim that another’s speech inflicts emotional distress 
because such speech offends their world view. Holding the Phelpses liable thus 
allows censorship of speech based upon its unpopular message. Given that the 
potential bases for tort liability are endless, such an approach threatens to 
remove contentious speech from public discussion. 
Part I of this Essay discusses the history of Snyder. Part II examines the 
Court’s doctrines pertaining to offensive speech, reviewing its longstanding 
jurisprudence protecting offensive messages and explaining why the Phelpses’ 
speech in Snyder fits within this doctrine. Part III then examines certain 
exceptions to the Court’s protection of speech—the captive audience and low 
value speech doctrines—and explains why attempts to analogize between these 
doctrines and the tort liability in Snyder fall short. Finally, Part IV discusses the 
psychology of emotions, focusing primarily on how anger arises. Relying on 
these psychological findings, Part IV explains why Snyder’s intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and invasion of privacy claims cannot fit 
within the existing free speech structure. The Essay concludes that the Court 
should not recognize a claim for IIED based on offensive messages like those 
involved in Snyder, as such liability risks undermining decades of the Court’s 
free speech jurisprudence and chilling protected speech. 
I 
SNYDER V. PHELPS BACKGROUND  
A. The Facts 
The Phelpses started protesting at the funerals of slain Iraqi and Afghan 
war veterans in 2005 to spread their belief that those wars were the ultimate 
result of America’s willingness to embrace homosexuality.14 Lawmakers have 
reacted overwhelmingly negatively to the protests, with the federal government 
and over forty states enacting laws regulating their expression.15  
 
13. See infra note 55 and Part III.B. 
14. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571–72 (D. Md. 2008) (describing the Phelpses’ 
view that “God hates homosexuality and hates and punishes America for its tolerance of 
homosexuality, particularly in the United States military”); Wells, supra note 5, at 160 & n.44.  
15. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2009); see also Wells, supra note 5, at 
161–74. 
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Snyder, however, involves a civil suit stemming from the Phelpses’ 
protest near the funeral of Snyder’s son, Lance Corporal Matthew Snyder.  
After issuing a press release and notifying local police about their intent to 
picket the funeral, seven members of Phelps’s congregation, the Westboro 
Baptist Church, protested at Matthew Snyder’s funeral with signs bearing 
messages similar or identical to those described above.16 The protestors were 
not noisy, did not block access to the funeral, and obeyed all official directives 
to remain at least several hundred feet from the ceremony.17 Although Snyder 
was aware of the Phelpses’ presence nearby, he did not see their signs until 
after the funeral when he viewed a news broadcast in his home.18  
The Phelpses also posted an Internet “epic” on their website mentioning 
Snyder and his son.19 The Phelpses’ online post claimed that the Snyders 
“raised [their son] for the devil, . . . [and] taught [him] to defy his Creator, to 
divorce and to commit adultery . . . [and] to support the largest pedophile 
machine in the history of the entire world, the Roman Catholic monstrosity.”20 
Snyder also did not view this post until days later when he ran a Google search 
about his son’s funeral on the Internet.21 Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the 
Phelpses’ expression, Snyder experienced severe emotional distress, becoming 
tearful and angry upon recalling their actions and suffering physical effects 
such as vomiting and an exacerbation of his diabetes.22 
B. The Lawsuit 
Snyder sued the Phelpses for IIED and invasion of privacy by intrusion 
upon seclusion in 2007.23 Although the district court cautioned the jury against 
suppressing merely offensive speech, it also noted that free speech interests 
“must be balanced against a state’s interest in protecting its residents from 
wrongful injury.”24 According to the court, the Phelpses could be liable for 
speech directed at Snyder if their “actions would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person, . . . were extreme and outrageous and . . . were so offensive 
and shocking as to not be entitled to First Amendment protection.”25 The jury 
returned a verdict of $10.9 million against the Phelpses.26 The district court 
judge denied the Phelpses’ post-trial motions based on the First Amendment, 
ruling that the protestors’ expression created an “atmosphere of confrontation” 
 
16. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 211–12. 
17. See id. at 212. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. (describing the “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder”).  
20. Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. May 24, 2010); Snyder 
v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 212 (4th Cir. 2009).  
21. Id.  
22. Id. at 213; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 8. 
23. The court dismissed Snyder’s defamation and publicity given to private life claims. 
Snyder, 580 F.3d at 212–13.  
24. Id. at 214–15. 
25. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 3113–14). 
26. Id. at 211. 
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that invoked the rights of mourners to “avoid being verbally assaulted by 
outrageous speech and comment during a time of bereavement.”27  
The Fourth Circuit, however, found that the First Amendment protected 
the Phelpses’ speech. Although recognizing that the expression profoundly 
distressed Snyder, the appellate court ruled that tort liability was inappropriate 
when speech “cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an 
individual.”28 The court concluded that the Phelpses’ speech could not 
reasonably be read to imply an assertion about the Snyders, and even if it could, 
the speech expressed “subjective opinion” and “hyperbolic rhetoric intended to 
spark [public] debate.”29 According to the Fourth Circuit, the First Amendment 
provides “breathing space for [such] contentious speech,” even when it 
involves “exaggeration, . . . vilification of men . . . [and] the probability of 
excesses and abuses.”30 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in March 2010.31 
II 
OFFENSIVE SPEECH IN THE SUPREME COURT 
The Court has long recognized that expression can “sti[r] people to 
anger,” “strike at prejudices and preconceptions,” and have “profound 
unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.”32 Nevertheless, the 
Court has consistently found that the government may not curtail speech 
“simply because the speaker’s message may be offensive to his audience.”33 
The Court protects offensive speech for two reasons. First, speech on matters of 
public concern retains its value even when delivered in an offensive manner.34 
Second, attempts to punish offensive speech too often lead to censorship of 
unpopular ideas.35 
Snyder implicates the Court’s offensive speech jurisprudence in its purest 
sense. The Phelpses’ expression was disrespectful, even contemptible, but, as 
the Fourth Circuit found, it falls squarely within the realm of public discourse.36 
 
27. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 577, 579 (D. Md. 2008). 
28. Snyder, 580 F.3d at 218 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 
(1990)). 
29. Id. at 223. 
30. Id. at 226 (quotations omitted). 
31. 130 S. Ct. 1737 (Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 09-751). 
32. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
33. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000); see also Forsyth County v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134–35 (1992); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55–56 (1988); Cohen 
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940). 
34. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4 (“The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society 
depends on free discussion . . . . [A] function of free speech under our system of government is to 
invite dispute.”). 
35. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (Indiscriminate punishment of offensive speech “effectively 
empower[s] a majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal predilections.”). 
36. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 222–23 (4th Cir. 2009). 
76 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW CIRCUIT [Vol.  1:71 
The Phelpses’ signs and Internet epic expressed their opinions on the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars, the validity of the Catholic faith, and gay rights.37 Such 
topics are of considerable contemporaneous interest to the public.38 That speech 
also conveys beliefs the Phelpses sincerely hold. As one court noted: 
[The Phelpses] have long expressed their religious views by . . . 
picket[ing] . . . various . . . public events that they view as promoting 
homosexuality, idolatry, and other sin. . . . [T]hey have also picketed 
near funerals of gay persons, persons who died from AIDS, people 
whose lifestyles they believe to be sinful but who are touted as heroic 
upon their death, and people whose actions while alive had supported 
homosexuality and other activities they consider proud sin. . . . [The 
Phelpses] believe that one of the great sins of America is idolatry in 
the form of worshiping the human instead of God and that, in America, 
this has taken the form of intense worship of the dead, particularly 
soldiers. . . .39  
Although the Phelpses’ speech is well outside mainstream thought, the Court’s 
doctrine maintains such expression is part of public discourse. As the Court 
noted, “[m]ost of what we say to one another lacks religious, political, 
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value (let alone serious 
value), but it is still sheltered from government regulation.”40  
Furthermore, the negative public reaction to the Phelpses’ speech, and 
arguments favoring imposing tort liability on the family, suggests a strong risk 
of censorship of their speech. Unlike neutral laws regulating the time, place, 
and manner of any protests near funerals, a lawsuit seeking imposition of 
damages targets particular individuals or groups and is far more likely a 
response to the protestors’ offensive messages.41 Typically, the Court would 
find this to be reason alone to eschew regulation: “[T]hat society may find 
speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it is the 
speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according 
it constitutional protection.”42   
 
37. See supra notes 4 & 20. 
38. Media outlets regularly address these issues. See, e.g., Rod Nordland, 12 NATO 
Soldiers, 7 From U.S., Are Killed in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A11; Christopher 
Hitchens, Bring the Pope to Justice, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 23, 2010, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/04/22/bring-the-pope-to-justice.html; Peter Moskos, Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell: Farewell to My Father’s Idea, WASH. POST, June 4, 2010, at A17; Maura Dolan, Gay 
Rights Groups Lose a Round, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2008, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jul/17/local/me-gaymarriage17. 
39. Phelps-Roper v. Bruning, No. 4:10CV3131, 2010 WL 2723202, at *1 (D. Neb. July 6, 
2010). 
40. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591 (2010) (citation omitted) (original 
emphasis). 
41. Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 
CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 1, 32–33 (2000) (discussing how broadly applicable neutral statutes 
better protect against censorship compared to restrictions applicable to particular individuals). 
42. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 
312, 322 (1988); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–24 (1971).   
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Those arguing for tort liability in Snyder, however, claim that the 
Phelpses’ speech falls within exceptions to the Court’s First Amendment 
protection. Specifically, they (1) argue that the Court’s captive audience 
doctrine allows regulation of offensive speech that invades the listener’s 
privacy, and (2) analogize liability for IIED and invasion of privacy to the 
Court’s other areas of low value speech, such as libel or fighting words. As 
discussed below, tort liability based solely on offensive messages would 
require substantial extension of the Court’s jurisprudence. 
III 
EXCEPTIONS TO FREE SPEECH PROTECTION 
A. Invasion of Privacy and the Captive Audience 
The Court’s captive audience doctrine allows regulation of speech that 
unreasonably invades the privacy interests of listeners. This aspect of the 
Court’s jurisprudence is most clearly associated with the home, where privacy 
protection is at its apex.43 For example, the Court upheld content-based 
regulations controlling indecent broadcasts and mailings into the home.44 In 
Frisby v. Schultz, it also upheld content-neutral regulations of “targeted” 
picketing aimed at a single residence, recognizing that such picketing 
“inherently and offensively intrudes on residential privacy” because “the home 
becomes something less than the home.”45 
When the listener is in a public space, however, the Court is far less 
willing to recognize a captive audience. It rejected the notion that individuals 
have a “generalized right to be left alone on a public street or sidewalk.”46 
Rather, it requires that speech physically or aurally invade a zone of privacy 
before invoking the captive audience doctrine. Thus, the Court upheld claims 
based on aural intrusions by noisy protestors around medical clinics and 
schools, as well as physical intrusions from protestors who approached 
audience members so closely as to cause invasions of personal space.47 
Notably, however, the Court rejected attempts to invoke a captive audience 
rationale based solely on the offensiveness of the speaker’s message.48 Indeed, 
 
43. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988). 
44. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750; Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep’t., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970). 
45. 487 U.S. at 486 (citation omitted). 
46. Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 383 (1997) (citation omitted). For 
elaboration of this argument, see Wells, supra note 5, at 200–12, 228–30. 
47. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772 (1994) (upholding restriction 
on noisy protests around medical clinic); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 (1972) 
(upholding restriction on noisy and disruptive protests around schools); Schenck, 519 U.S. 357, 
384–85 (upholding injunction restricting protestors based on previous harassing and intimidating 
conduct); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 n.25 (2000) (upholding eight foot no-approach zone 
to prevent unwanted physical approaches of individuals at close range). 
48. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 773 (refusing to uphold an injunction banning “images 
observable” by persons within medical clinics because the only “plausible reason” such signs 
disturbed patients was that they “found the expression contained in such images disagreeable”). 
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the Court routinely states that in public, “the burden normally falls upon . . . 
viewer[s] to avoid further bombardment of . . . [their] sensibilities simply by 
averting . . . [their] eyes.”49 The fundamental tenet of the captive audience 
doctrine is that an individual in public can claim an invasion of privacy only 
when he or she encounters a physical or aural intrusion and cannot avoid that 
intrusion by moving or looking away. 
Supporters of tort liability, however, argue that mourners at a funeral have 
a privacy interest “at least as significant as the privacy interes[t] at stake in 
one’s home.”50 Accordingly, they liken the Phelpses’ protests to the 
“inherently” intrusive residential picketing in Frisby.51 Although friends and 
family surely have a privacy interest in mourning their loved ones free from 
disruption,52 the analogy to Frisby falls apart when one examines the 
“inherently” intrusive rationale. Frisby validated the regulation of targeted 
picketing because a picketer (even a solitary, quiet vigil) focusing on one’s 
residence day after day was akin to harassment.53 That concept of intrusion had 
nothing to do with the content of the speech but, rather, with the erosion of the 
home as a place of solitude. In fact, the Court made clear that one could protest 
in the neighborhood as long as he or she did not solely target a particular 
residence.54  
In contrast, finding the Phelpses’ speech intrusive in Snyder requires the 
Court to embrace the notion that peaceful protestors who stood several hundred 
feet away from the funeral somehow intruded upon it. Absent a physical or 
aural invasion, that concept of intrusion must rest solely on the offensiveness of 
the protestors’ message.55 In effect, the invasion of privacy claim in Snyder 
 
49. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (quoting 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).  
50. Brief for the State of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 13, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. June 1, 2010); see also 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 53. 
51. Brief for the State of Kansas, supra note 50, at 13–17; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
20, at 52–53. State officials defending funeral protest laws make similar arguments. Wells, supra 
note 5, at 214–17. 
52. Wells, supra note 5, at 228. 
53. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486–87 (1988) (finding that “[t]he devastating effect of 
targeted picketing on the quiet enjoyment of the home is beyond doubt”).   
54. Id. at 482–84. 
55. Several amicus briefs openly seek regulation of the content of the Phelpses’ message. 
E.g., Brief for the State of Kansas, supra note 50, at 15 (describing the Phelpses’ signs as 
“personal and vicious attacks, fully intended to target the mourners”); Brief for the Veterans of 
Foreign Wars of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 10, Snyder v. 
Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. June 1, 2010) (stating that the “First Amendment does not require the 
grieving family to endure offensive speech of a personally abusive nature”). Snyder, however, 
argues that the Phelpses’ mere presence at the funeral violated his privacy at a time when he was 
mourning and emotionally vulnerable. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 8–9. But this 
argument is grounded in the content of the Phelpses’ speech. There is nothing inherently offensive 
about peaceful, nondisruptive protests near a funeral; protests occurred in association with 
funerals well before the Phelpses’ activities. See, e.g., JOYCE L. KORNBLUH, REBEL VOICES:  AN 
IWW ANTHOLOGY 200 (1964) (discussing the 1913 funeral/protest of two workers killed by 
private detectives); Violent Protests Erupt After Funeral, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2000, at 
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rests on the notion that one can be captive to non-invasive but offensive 
messages expressed from a distance. This assertion is a significant extension of 
the Court’s existing doctrine and threatens speakers with content-based 
censorship. 
B. Low Value Speech 
The Court has carefully crafted its low value speech doctrines to identify 
narrow categories of speech capable of restriction.56 Although its methodology 
is not always clear, the Court recently noted that it does not find speech 
unprotected “on the basis of a simple cost-benefit analysis.”57 Rather, the 
structure of its low value speech categories reveals that the Court carefully 
limits regulation to prevent punishment of speech based solely on its offensive 
content.58 The Court finds speech unprotected only when it does not contribute 
to the exchange of ideas as evidenced by external indicia of harm resulting 
from speech or from actions that are independently harmful, such as threats or 
lies.59 For example, the Court recognizes that government can punish advocacy 
of unlawful action only if it is “directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and . . . [is] likely to incite or produce such action.”60 The Court 
also has permitted officials to punish fighting words only if they “have a direct 
tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually” they 
are addressed.61 And the Court’s libel jurisprudence requires plaintiffs to show 
that a defamatory statement causes actual harm to their reputation in order to 
recover damages.62 The Court designed these low value speech categories to 
preserve the “adequate breathing space” necessary for full exercise of First 
Amendment freedoms63 and to prevent punishment of speech based solely on 
 
A4 (discussing protest involving 3,000 marchers following funeral of man shot by police). 
Furthermore, Snyder welcomed protestors with a supportive message. See Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Writ of Cert. at 6–7, Snyder v. Phelps, No. 09-751 (U.S. Jan. 20, 2010) (describing the 
well-received “picketing” of school children and the Patriot Guard Riders at the Snyder funeral). 
Thus, the Phelpses’ speech is “inappropriate” only because of their disrespectful and hurtful 
message. 
56. Those categories include incitement of illegal action, fighting words, defamation, fraud, 
true threats, obscenity, child pornography, and speech integral to criminal conduct. See United 
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585–86 (2010). 
57. Id. at 1586. 
58. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1, 4–5 (1949). 
59. Daniel Farber, The Categorical Approach to Protecting Speech in American 
Constitutional Law, 84 IND. L.J. 917, 933 (2009) (“[T]he large majority of proscribed speech adds 
little or nothing to public discourse . . . partly because the [Court’s] ‘narrow tailoring’ requirement 
. . . [forces] the state to focus on speech that has little function except to threaten the government’s 
compelling interest [such as preventing violence or preserving individual reputation].”).   
60. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).   
61. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.  518, 523 (1972). 
62. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (refusing to allow presumed or 
punitive damages absent a finding that defendant acted with “knowledge of falsity or reckless 
disregard for the truth”). 
63. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); see also Bose Corp. v. 
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its “emotive impact.”64 
The IIED and invasion of privacy standards Snyder and others advocate 
do not incorporate these external indicia of harm and, thus, fit poorly within the 
Court’s low value speech categories. Snyder urges imposition of IIED liability, 
for example, based upon the common law elements of that tort.65 However, 
those elements—intent, extreme and outrageous conduct, and severe emotional 
harm66—are inconsistent with First Amendment protections. They do not 
prevent imposition of liability simply because the listener finds the expression 
at issue offensive or outrageous. 
In fact, the Court in Hustler v. Falwell already recognized that the 
common law standards for IIED do not sufficiently protect free speech values.67 
Falwell found that IIED’s “outrageousness” standard was so subjective as to 
“run[] afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded 
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the 
audience.”68 The Court also noted that the intent requirement did not protect 
public debate because the “speaker must run the risk that it will be proved in 
court that he spoke out of hatred.”69 Even speakers who act out of malice or ill 
will, the Court found, can contribute to public debate.70 Accordingly, Falwell 
required that public figures suing for IIED show a false statement of fact made 
with actual malice in order to recover damages. Falwell effectively recognized 
that the IIED tort fits uncomfortably within the Court’s low value speech 
framework and required an external indicia of harm when speech is the basis of 
the tort. Although Falwell’s holding is limited to public figures, the Court’s 
reasoning is applicable to the tort regardless of the subject of a suit—a false 
statement of fact made with actual malice is necessary to prevent censorship of 
any speech related to public concern, not just speech related to public figures. 
The broad invasion of privacy argument embraced by Snyder and others 
faces similar problems. The common law elements of invasion of privacy 
typically involve (1) an unauthorized intrusion, (2) into a secluded space or 
one’s private affairs, (3) that is highly offensive to a reasonable person.71 These 
 
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505 (1984) (describing Court review as 
designed  “to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably narrow limits 
in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited”). 
64. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (quotation omitted); see also Falwell, 485 
U.S. at 55. 
65. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 20, at 21–41 (arguing against the imposition of First 
Amendment standards in Snyder’s IIED case). 
66. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1986). 
67. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56. Falwell involved common law standards nearly identical to 
Maryland’s standards. Id. at 50 n.3. 
68. Id. at 55. 
69. Id. at 53 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)). 
70. Id.  
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977) (defining the intrusion upon 
seclusion form of invasion of privacy as “intentionally intrud[ing], physically or otherwise, upon 
the solitude of another or his private affairs or concerns . . . [when] the intrusion would be highly 
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elements protect against punishment of speech based on its emotional impact 
by recognizing only physical, spatial, or aural intrusions into a secluded area.72 
Snyder and others, however, urge the Court to find an invasion of privacy 
because they find the Phelpses’ message abhorrent, an argument that divorces 
the notion of “intrusion” from the physical, spatial, or aural invasion required at 
common law. Their argument conflates the first element of the tort, an 
intrusion, with the third element, that the intrusion be offensive to a reasonable 
person, and urges that the Phelpses’ speech is intrusive because it offends a 
reasonable person. As with imposition of tort liability for IIED, that approach 
lacks an external indicium of harm and allows punishment of the “emotive 
impact of speech.”73 
IV 
EMOTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Several observers argue that this emotional impact is precisely the reason 
why Snyder should recover damages. They claim, for example, that the First 
Amendment should not protect “the use of words as weapons” and argue 
allowing tort liability for highly offensive speech will not interfere with robust 
“public discourse.”74 Supporters of Snyder contend that compelling private 
persons to show anything beyond the common law requirements leaves them 
“helpless against malicious speakers,” unlike public figures who must endure 
insults and humiliation.75 Few people doubt the power of words to inflict 
emotional wounds. Snyder exemplifies this. But psychological research on 
emotion reveals the Court’s wisdom in refusing to allow regulation of speech 
based on its emotive impact. 
A. The Psychology of Anger 
Contrary to conventional and legal wisdom, which often treat emotion as 
 
offensive to a reasonable person”). 
72. See, e.g., Schulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P. 2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998) 
(“[P]laintiff must show the defendant penetrated some zone of physical or sensory privacy 
surrounding, or obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff. The tort is proven only if the 
plaintiff had an objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, 
conversation or data source.”); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND 
PRIVACY § 5:89 (2d. ed. 2010) (Intrusion usually “involves some physical, not merely 
psychological, incursion into one’s privacy,” including invasion of space around a person via 
surveillance or stalking.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. B (1977) (Intrusion 
requires physical intrusion into a place of plaintiff’s seclusion or “by the use of the defendant’s 
senses, with or without mechanical aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs.”).  
73. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 412 (1989) (quotation omitted). 
74. Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost?: Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort 
Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 313, 336 (2010); see also Chelsea Brown, Not Your 
Mother’s Remedy: A Civil Action Response to the Westboro Baptist Church’s Military Funeral 
Demonstrations, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 207, 232 (2009); Brief for the State of Kansas, supra note 
50, at 23–24, 33–34. 
75. Shulman, supra note 74, at 336. 
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irrational and fleeting, emotions “are determined, in large part, by beliefs.”76 
They are the primary mechanism by which humans understand and respond to 
their environment.77 Accordingly, “people’s emotions arise from their 
perceptions of their circumstances—immediate, imagined, or remembered.”78 
Emotions thus have a strong cognitive component. The circumstances of a 
given situation, as well as how a person appraises those circumstances, 
determine whether a person experiences a particular emotion. For instance, 
psychologists believe that emotions occur according to “core relational themes” 
and particular appraisals result in particular emotions.79 As Terry Mahoney 
explains, core relational themes “are a ‘psychobiological principle’ captured as 
an ‘if-then’ formulation: if a person appraises his or her relationship to the 
environment in a particular way then a specific emotion always follows.”80 An 
individual will experience the emotion “anger,” for example, when they 
perceive that another person engaged in a demeaning offense against him or 
her.81 
Not everyone, however, perceives the same action as demeaning.82 
Rather, a variety of environmental and personality factors affect whether 
people respond to an offense with a particular emotion as well as the intensity 
of their response. Thus, an individual’s personal goals, values, and beliefs 
affect his or her emotional response.83 If people perceive an offending actor to 
interfere with those goals, values, and beliefs—especially intentionally and in a 
manner that could have been avoided—they will likely respond with anger, 
even outrage.84 People’s appraisals that an offender’s behavior violates social 
 
76. Maroney, supra note 12, at 891. Conventional legal wisdom often treats emotion as 
unpredictable and visceral. See Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A 
Psychological Analysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1, 15 (1997). 
77. Maroney, supra note 12, at 874; see also Craig A. Smith & Richard S. Lazarus, 
Emotion and Adaptation, in HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY: THEORY AND RESEARCH 609, 611 
(Lawrence A. Pervin ed., 1990). 
78. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Klaus R. Scherer, Appraisal Processes in Emotion, in 
HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 572, 572 (Richard J. Davidson et al. eds., 2003). 
79. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 81–82; Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Craig A. Smith, From 
Appraisal to Emotion: Differences Among Unpleasant Feelings, 12 MOTIVATION AND EMOTION 
271, 272 (1988); Matthias Siemer et al., Same Situation—Different Emotions: How Appraisals 
Shape Our Emotions, 7 EMOTION 592, 598 (2007). 
80. Maroney, supra note 12, at 892. 
81. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 222; Paul Ekman, Antecedent Events and Emotion 
Metaphors, in THE NATURE OF EMOTION: FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS 146, 147 (P. Ekman & R. 
Davidson eds., 1994). 
82. Smith & Lazarus, supra note 77, at 616 (“Appraisals are strongly influenced by 
personality variables. Two individuals can construe their situations quite similarly (agree on all 
the facts) and yet react with very different emotions, because they have appraised the adaptational 
significance of those facts differently.”). 
83. Id. at 625. 
84. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 222–23; GERALD CLORE, ANDREW ORTNEY & ALLAN 
COLLINS, THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS 146–54 (1988); see also Gerald L. Clore & 
Karen Gasper, Feeling Is Believing: Some Affective Influences on Belief, in EMOTIONS AND 
BELIEFS: HOW FEELINGS INFLUENCE THOUGHTS 10, 30 (Nico H. Frijda et al. eds., 2000); Siemer 
et al., supra note 79, at 595. 
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norms may also lead to or exacerbate this anger.85 Perceived disrespectful 
treatment is an especially common trigger of anger.86 
People also tend toward particular actions when experiencing particular 
emotions. Thus, those who experience anger tend to express a greater 
willingness to attack the offending individual.87 Sometimes this attack comes in 
the form of violence.88 At other times, especially when anger results from a 
perceived injustice, an attack can occur through formalized mechanisms, 
including filing civil lawsuits.89 
B. Emotion, Tort Liability and Snyder 
This psychological research reveals the problematic nature of the civil 
claims in Snyder. They are not problematic because emotions such as anger are 
inherently bad or because emotion has no role in First Amendment doctrine. 
Indeed, the Court has recognized the important relationship between emotion 
and expression.90 But the manner in which emotion plays a role in Snyder has 
the potential to undermine the very framework of the Court’s jurisprudence and 
generally destabilize its protection of offensive and unpopular speech.  
Outrageous action is the core element of IIED. When actions, such as 
having sexual relations with the spouse of one’s client,91 are the basis for tort 
liability, this element is less problematic. But when one seeks damages based 
upon “outrageous” speech that otherwise contributes to public discourse, IIED 
lawsuits become tools of censorship. One does not sue under those 
circumstances unless the content of the speech reflects beliefs that interfere 
with one’s own. Limiting liability to the most outrageous speech will not curb 
such lawsuits. The more that people are outraged, the more certain they become 
of the validity of their beliefs and the invalidity of conflicting beliefs.92 
Outrageous speech merely reinforces the plaintiff’s belief that he or she was 
wronged by the defendant’s message, especially if it is disrespectful. 
 
85. Smith & Lazarus, supra note 77, at 627; Ellsworth & Scherer, supra note 78, at 581. 
86. Dale T. Miller, Disrespect and the Experience of Injustice, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 
527, 533 (2001). 
87. LAZARUS, supra note 10, at 226; see Ellsworth & Smith, supra note 79, at 296. 
88. See, e.g., Dov Cohen et al., Insult, Aggression, and the Southern Culture of Honor: An 
“Experimental Ethnography,” 70 J. PERSON. & SOC. PSYCH. 945 (1996) (studying insults to honor 
among Southern and Northern males, and linking propensity for hostile reaction to insults to 
whether one had grown up in Southern “honor” culture).  
89. Miller, supra note 86, at 544 (noting that desire for retribution is a motivator for 
lawsuits and that disrespectful treatment can increase people’s willingness to avail themselves of 
formal avenues of redress); see also Ellsworth & Smith, supra note 79, at 301 (noting that angry 
people might seek less aggressive, more socially acceptable means of retaliation if they are 
influenced by other factors). 
90. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (noting that “words are often chosen as 
much for their emotive as their cognitive force”).  
91. Figueiredo-Torres v. Nickel, 584 A.2d 69, 77 (1991) (upholding IIED claim against 
psychologist who had sexual relations with patient’s wife). 
92. Clore & Gasper, supra note 84, at 30 (noting that “emotional feeling can then increase 
certainty or commitment”). 
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Accordingly, the very nature of IIED encourages lawsuits when plaintiffs 
profoundly disagree with or are insulted by defendants’ speech. The Court has 
never allowed punishment of speech for such reasons.93   
The other elements of IIED do nothing to limit potential censorship.  
Although the intent requirement superficially limits liability to the worst actors, 
it does little to protect free speech values. As noted above, an offender’s 
perceived blameworthiness is a component of an outraged plaintiff’s 
response—the defendant’s perceived blameworthiness is partly why the 
plaintiff is angry. Anger also often causes plaintiffs to attribute bad intent to 
those they want to find blameworthy, whether or not they actually acted with 
such intent.94 Accordingly, IIED’s intent standard overlaps substantially with 
and reinforces the outrage element, making use of the tort especially 
problematic to punish speech that violates widely held social norms. That 
speech is the very type of expression most likely to anger plaintiffs and cause 
them to attribute blame.95 Similarly, the requirement of severe emotional 
distress does not prevent punishment of speech based merely on the content of 
its message. Even speech that contributes to public discourse can result in such 
distress.96   
Similar censorship problems arise with Snyder’s invasion of privacy 
argument. Conflating intrusion and offensiveness reduces the question of tort 
liability to whether speech is offensive to a reasonable person. As with IIED, a 
plaintiff is most likely offended by speech that interferes with his or her values 
and beliefs. Although invasion of privacy also requires an intrusion upon 
seclusion, that concept is malleable97 and alone cannot prevent punishment 
based solely on a plaintiff’s offense at the speaker’s message if the intrusion 
element is equated with offensive conduct. In fact, the district court’s 
instructions to the jury in Snyder effectively ignored the seclusion element and 
 
93. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 415 (1989) (holding that the state cannot regulate flag 
burning to promote respect for the flag); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988) (finding 
unconstitutional a law prohibiting the display of signs tending to bring foreign governments into 
public odium or disrepute); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22–24 (1971) (holding that the state 
cannot censor citizens to promote public civility). 
94. CLORE, ORTNEY & COLLINS, supra note 84, at 151; Miller, supra note 86, at 537. 
95. It is perhaps not surprising that Falwell rejected the intent standard of IIED as 
insufficiently protective of speech. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988) (quoting 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964)). 
96. Although emotional distress can manifest in physical symptoms (occasionally required 
to recover in some jurisdictions), such symptoms are not objective indicia of harm like the threats, 
violence or other indicia present in the Court’s low value speech categories or captive audience 
doctrine. Physical symptoms, although more tangible than emotional harm, still emanate from the 
listener’s response to the offensive message. Such a response is not consistent with the Court’s 
conception of low value speech as speech that, by definition, does not contribute to public 
discourse. 
97. Wells, supra note 5, at 181–82 (“recognizing relative zones of privacy involves a 
delicate balance of preserving social interaction while carving out necessary spaces of refuge in 
public”); MCCARTHY, supra note 72, § 5:98 (noting that zones of seclusion are a product of 
“custom and usage” rather than of objective factors). 
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focused almost entirely on the potential outrageousness and offensiveness of 
the Phelpses’ expression, despite the common law elements of the tort.98 It is 
unsurprising, then, that the jury returned a verdict in Snyder’s favor. 
Ultimately, tort liability based solely upon speech that offends or outrages 
others would chill speech because of its arbitrary and unpredictable nature. 
Responses to speech are particularized and personal. Anyone may respond with 
anger, and a lawsuit, to speech they consider demeaning and personally 
offensive. To be sure, most offensive speech will not satisfy the elements of 
IIED or invasion of privacy. But any contentious speech perceived to be 
personally directed—such as criticism of one’s religion, criticism of military 
efforts, or burning the flag—could be the basis for a tort suit. The capricious 
nature of such lawsuits would cast a pall over public debate.99 
The existence of a jury, which should filter truly frivolous claims of 
offense or outrage, also cannot prevent this chilling effect. Juries cannot 
prevent the potential filing of such lawsuits, which alone chills public 
discourse.100 Additionally, although juries might filter the most specious 
claims, they may facilitate censorship in other ways. In fact, the more society 
perceives speech to violate or disrespect widely held social norms, the more 
likely a jury will sympathize with the plaintiff. As one noted psychologist 
found: 
The arousal of moralistic anger is not confined to injustices 
perpetrated against one’s self. Witnessing the harming of a third 
party can also arouse strong feelings of anger and injustice. . . . 
Individuals are committed to the “ought forces” of their moral 
community . . . and people believe these forces deserve respect from 
all members of the community. The violation of these forces 
represents an insult to the integrity of the community and provokes 
both moralistic anger and the urge to punish the offender in its 
members.101 
A jury will most likely experience “moralistic anger” when a speaker 
violates otherwise widely held social norms, such as protesting near another’s 
funeral. While the emotional response of jurors may be an issue in any trial, it 
is uniquely concerning in First Amendment cases. Juries in civil tort suits are 
 
98. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
99. Like a vague statute, the lack of notice associated with lawsuits based on offensive 
speech subjects potential defendants to arbitrary and inconsistent enforcement. Smith v. Goguen, 
415 U.S. 566, 573–74 (1974) (finding that a flag contempt statute “fails to draw reasonably clear 
lines between the kinds of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those that are not”); see 
also Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Tort, 
2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 302 (2010) (“[T]he vagueness of the ‘outrageousness’ 
standard exacerbates the risk that the emotional distress tort will deter . . . speech.”).  
100. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (discussing how the threat of 
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101. Miller, supra note 86, at 535. 
86 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW CIRCUIT [Vol.  1:71 
likely to punish unpopular speakers precisely because they are unpopular. Such 
a result runs counter to First Amendment tenets because it silences particular 
viewpoints102 and “lead[s] to standardization of ideas . . . by courts [and] 
dominant political or community groups.”103 
CONCLUSION 
If the Phelpses were noisy or disruptive, officials could justifiably regulate 
their protests. Civil liability for IIED and invasion of privacy might also be 
appropriate if the Phelpses’ expression contained threats, intentional lies, or 
other external indicia of harm.104 But the speech here did not involve those 
circumstances. It involved offensive messages. For good reason, the Court’s 
doctrine has never allowed regulation of speech solely on that basis. Because of 
the nature of emotional reactions to offensive speech, allowing plaintiffs to rely 
on offense alone turns civil lawsuits into potential tools of suppression. While 
the law has never shown much solicitude for the intentional infliction of 
emotional harm or invasion of privacy,105 the Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence surely does not countenance the primacy of these torts. 
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